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Th e problem of ethical relativism has never been resolved or laid to 
rest. It turns out to be a complicated set of problems, involving many 
philosophical issues of meaning (Brandt 1954; Ladd 1957). For ex-
ample, how should we defi ne morality and ethics? How should we 
defi ne the problem of ethical relativism? How does the problem of 
ethical relativism relate to the problem of cultural relativism? 
One question that is part of this package is a scientifi c one and 
concerns whether there are even aspects of moral values and ethical 
discourse that can be validly abstracted from their cultural context 
and compared cross-culturally. Th is is the problem of “descriptive 
ethical relativism” (Ladd 1957; Spiro 1984). Obviously, if there are 
no such aspects, then we have good reason to embrace an extreme 
doctrine of descriptive ethical relativism. On the other hand, if scien-
tifi c research indicates that there are comparable aspects, then we can 
go on to ask a second, primarily philosophical question. 
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Th e second question (Ladd and Spiro call it the issue of “norma-
tive ethical relativism”) concerns whether the ethical confl icts of in-
dividuals or cultural groups are somehow resolvable. Th ey might be 
resolvable if ethical confl icts can somehow be reduced to mere diff er-
ences in underlying factual beliefs (about nature, human personality, 
and so on). Th ey might not be resolvable if ethical confl icts turn out 
to be based on diff erences in moral principles, even after the diff er-
ences in factual beliefs are accounted for. 
Th is paper shall address the fi rst question, because I feel it is the 
one social scientists (as opposed to moral philosophers) are most 
qualifi ed to answer. Th e question, as I see it, involves an analysis of 
research methodology. How can social scientists elicit samples of peo-
ple’s ethical discourse? Do these samples of discourse validly repre-
sent the individual’s or group’s moral and ethical understanding? Can 
these samples be compared in some systematic way cross-culturally 
without distortion of their basic meaning? 
“Ethical discourse” can be defi ned as a string of statements or ar-
guments containing “moral statements” (statements about what ac-
tions or attitudes are obligatory or virtuous) and/or “ethical state-
ments” (statements about why those actions or attitudes are mor-
ally right or wrong). Ladd, who studied the ethical discourse of the 
Navaho (1957), believes that ethical discourse occurs in all cultural 
groups. 
TWO CONTRASTING APPROACHES 
A subdiscipline within psychology, variously known as the “cog-
nitive-developmental,” “cognitive-structuralist,” or simply “Piagetian” 
school, shares with anthropology a central interest in the formal or 
structured aspects of human ethical discourse. However, in spite of 
their common interest, the two traditions have remained unintegrat-
ed, with little cross-fertilization of ideas, because they are character-
ized by opposing assumptions. I shall try to argue, though, that steps 
toward integration would have much to off er both sides, in terms of 
wrestling with the bear of ethical relativism. 
In earlier papers I have tried to persuade psychologists of the 
merits of the anthropological perspective (Edwards 1978, 1979, 
1982, 1985b; Harkness, Edwards, and Super 1981). Th is paper goes 
the other way and suggests that anthropologists interested in the
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study of values might well take a new look at the cognitive-develop-
mental research. In particular, they might view its methodology as an 
additional useful way of eliciting information about the range and 
complexity of ethical beliefs held by people within a cultural com-
munity. 
Th e underlying assumption that has created a chasm between the 
two traditions concerns not whether ethical discourse is structured or 
organized (both sides agree on that) but rather the nature and source 
of the structure (Shweder 1982). Anthropologists typically view eth-
ical discourse as a cultural product, culturally constructed and trans-
mitted from adults to children. Th ese scientists therefore tend to be 
“descriptive relativists.” Th at is, they tend to believe that each indi-
vidual’s moral and ethical ideas are relative to the cultural group in 
which he or she lives and determined in large part by contextual or 
experiential conditions. Furthermore, insofar as they also believe that 
every culture’s ethical system must be treated as a unique whole, they 
may additionally assert a second thesis of “descriptive relativism,” 
namely, that there is an irreducible diversity of moral standards—an in-
commensurability across cultural boundaries. 
In contrast, the cognitive-developmental psychologists take a dif-
ferent view of the source of structure in ethical discourse. Without 
denying that a large part of any moral code is culturally transmitted, 
they assert that rational considerations also play a major role in the de-
termination of the structure of ethical discourse. After all, they argue, 
the speakers of ethical discourse are people, thinking people, and the 
structure of people’s knowledge in all domains—ethics included—
involves the cognitive control and manipulation of concrete or ab-
stract concepts, categories, or skills (Colby et al. 1983; Fischer 1980; 
Kohlberg 1983; Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer 1983; Turiel 1983). It 
is the logical structure of knowledge (in particular, its level of com-
plexity) that is commensurable cross-culturally. 
Th us, these psychologists assert, constraints set by the very nature 
of human cognition limit the number of basic ways in which people 
in any culture can judge, choose, validate or justify moral prescrip-
tions as a part of ethical discourse. Th ere may be an unlimited diver-
sity of ethical systems but not of logical-types of ethical arguments. 
If this thesis is correct, then we have good reason to reject an ex-
treme doctrine of descriptive ethical relativism. At least one part of
everyone’s ethical system is determined not by his or her cultural ex-
perience but rather by cognitive reasoning processes. 
Some anthropologists are forceful advocates of just such a pro-
posal (e.g., Spiro 1984). However, most anthropologists would prob-
ably disagree with a further proposal of that group of psychologists, 
namely, that the set of logical-types of ethical argument and justifi ca-
tion are tied to an invariant, universal, developmental sequence. 
Lawrence Kohlberg (1981, 1983; Kohlberg, Levine, and Hew-
er 1983), for instance, has proposed a six-stage sequence of moral 
judging involving an increasingly abstract, articulated, and explicit 
understanding of morality. Th e ethical discourse that is graded in 
terms of the stages is elicited by a dilemma interview method. In-
formants are told short hypothetical problem-stories and asked to 
explain both what a person should do and why. A description of the 
stages, in terms of their structures for deciding “what is right,” “rea-
sons for doing right,” and the “social perspective” underlying deci-
sion making, is presented in Table 1. (Th e table is taken from Kohl-
berg 1983: 174-176.) 
Within any cultural community, Kohlberg claims, individual dif-
ferences are seen in ethical discourse that are tied to age and personal 
development (that is, to level of cognitive maturation and amount of 
“role-taking” experience). Th us, the young children in all cultures are 
hypothesized to “sound a lot alike” when they engage in ethical dis-
course because of their cognitive concreteness (information process-
ing limitations). 
Similarly, at the other end of the developmental continuum we 
might fi nd the moral elders (perhaps those infl uential “good talk-
ers,” found in every cultural group, whose opinions are regarded by 
the whole community as worthy of respect). Th ese moral elders, or 
“moralists” as Ladd (1957) calls them, might be expected to “speak 
in a similar voice” in terms of controlling highly abstract systems 
of moral judging and ethical reasoning. Under some cultural con-
ditions, these same “moralists” might well be the people most able 
to cognitively “step outside” the bounds of local ethical concepts 
and generate a critical analysis, a meta-ethical perspective, on real-
ity (Levy 1984). 
Is there any reason for anthropologists to take a closer look at 
what must surely seem to many of them to be a preposterous pair 
of claims? I think there are four reasons to do so, and they relate to
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recent revisions or reconsiderations going on within the cognitive-
developmental school. 
THE DILEMMA INTERVIEW METHOD 
Th e purpose of using moral dilemmas to elicit ethical discourse is 
that they confront people with two genuine goods, two felt values, 
to choose between. Th e choosing process is diffi  cult, therefore, and 
a deliberative or refl ective judging process tends to move into con-
sciousness and become accessible to the interviewer. Obviously, the 
validity of the whole approach depends upon the dilemma interview 
method being a fair way in which to tap moral standards and ethi-
cal reasoning. 
Richard Shweder (1982; Shweder, Turiel, and Much 1981) has 
criticized the dilemma method for its basis in “refl ective reasoning” 
(requiring an ability to articulate what is thought); he prefers to in-
vestigate “tacit knowledge” (implicit in people’s practice and action 
choices). While I agree with Shweder that “tacit knowledge” is ex-
tremely important to study, nevertheless my own fi eld experience 
in Kenya (Edwards 1974) has convinced me that the “refl ective” 
reasoning process is not simply a Western cultural process, nor one 
dependent on formal education. Quite the contrary, persons of all 
ages, ethnic groups, and walks of life in Kenya seemed aroused, in-
terested, and motivated to talk about moral dilemmas. Tacit knowl-
edge and refl ective knowledge seem to be two ends of the continu-
um of moral and ethical knowledge in at least many if not all cul-
tural groups. 
One dilemma in particular aroused genuine interest during my 
fi eldwork and caused people to make comments like, “Th at’s a very 
hard question. Let me think a minute.” Th is dilemma was developed 
expressly for the Kenyan setting (I am indebted to John Whiting 
for it), and is presented in Table 2. Th e dilemma pits two sets of val-
ued status obligations against each other (those a man incurs as “son” 
and “brother” versus those he incurs as “husband and father”). While 
quite diff erent from the older Kohlberg dilemmas, this new problem 
proved quite easy to use and score. 
How well does the interview method work with respect to cross-
cultural research? By now there has accumulated a large body of 
studies involving the use of Kohlberg’s moral dilemma interview 
TABLE 2 
Hypothetical Moral Dilemma
Daniel and the School Fees 
A man, Daniel, managed to complete his secondary school education (Form 4) 
on the basis of school fees given him by his brother. Afterwards he married and took 
his wife to live with his parents in the rural area, while he got a job in the city. Eight 
years later, when his fi rst son was ready to go to primary school, his mother and fa-
ther came to him and said, “Your brother who educated you has been in an accident 
and cannot work, so you must now begin to pay for the education of your brother’s 
child.” Th is child was the same age as his own son. Th e man, Daniel, did not have 
enough money to pay school fees for both his own son and his brother’s child. His 
wife said he must put his own son fi rst. 
1. What should Daniel do in this situation? Should he put his son or his 
brother’s child fi rst? Why? 
2. What obligation does he have to his brother who educated him? 
3. What does he owe his son? 
4. Should he obey his parents in this case? Do you think a grown son has to 
obey all of his parents’ wishes? Why, or why not? 
5. What should a grown son do for his parents? 
6. Is it more important to maintain harmonious relations with his wife or 
with his brother and parents? Why? 
7. Would you condemn Daniel if he just moved his wife and children to the 
city and did not pay for the education of his nephew? Why? 
8. Would you yourself expect your eldest children to help their younger 
brothers and sisters with school fees? Why, or why not? 
method. Some 45 studies of moral development have been carried 
out in 27 countries (Snarey 1985). Th e quality of research has im-
proved steadily over time. Recent reports are typically based on much 
more solid and extensive ethnographic understanding, a closer at-
tention to translation issues, and more creative attempts to adapt the 
moral dilemma methodology to indigenous concerns than was typi-
cal of the early research. 
For example, Benjamin Lee (1973, 1976) investigated Taiwanese 
philosophy and culture and concluded that a debate had gone on 
for centuries in China concerning the “fi liality” of certain types of 
actions. One particular type of problematical actions are those that 
might be benefi cial to one’s parents or ancestors but morally wrong 
in terms of another major value. Lee constructed four dilemmas cen-
tered on fi liality. One problem-situation, for instance, concerned 
whether a “fi lial son” should testify in court against his father if his 
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father is a spy for the communists. Lee found that his fi liality prob-
lems worked well to elicit refl ective ethical discourse by people of dif-
ferent ages and educational backgrounds in Taiwan. 
More recently, Ann Tietjan and Lawrence Walker (in press) have 
reported research in Papua New Guinea for which they constructed 
a moral dilemma based on an actual village event. Th is dilemma in-
volves a man who has to decide whether to break the ban placed on 
fi shing in the sea by the elders of his village. Th e ban is the custom-
ary taboo following the death of a community member, but the man’s 
problem arises because there is a food shortage and his family is hun-
gry. Tietjen and Walker used their new dilemma along with adapta-
tions of four of the standard Kohlberg dilemmas. 
In sum, while a great deal more in the way of improvements is still 
needed, nevertheless, the research does suggest that a moral dilemma 
method can work in many cultural settings to elicit or tap a rich vein 
of informants’ ethical discourse. 
A productive approach for future researchers might be to draw 
heavily upon local proverbs and myths as a source of “problem situ-
ations.” For example, in Kenya I found that many people from a di-
versity of ethnic groups produced a proverb as part of their response 
to the School Fees dilemma. Here are some examples of comments 
made by informants: 
Th is is the same as what we say, “Before you remove the speck from somebody’s 
eye, you have to remove the speck in your own eye.” [Meru man, age 28] 
Kikuyus say that, “You start with yours before you jump into another’s,” and Eu-
ropeans say, “I fi rst, you second.” [Kikuyu man, age 65]
It is said that when the fi re sparks on you and another, you have to remove it off  
yourself fi rst. [Kipsigis woman, age 40]
It is said that if the fi re sparks jump on you when you are holding the baby, you 
have to remove yours fi rst, even though the baby is yours. [Kipsigis man, age 75]
It seems that this family of related proverbs codifi es or distills eth-
ical wisdom for the African groups of Kenya. Each proverb both 
presents a problem (“a burning spark lands on you and a baby”) and 
an answer as to what one should do (“brush it off  yourself fi rst, then 
take care of the baby”). Given that the proverb implicitly involves a 
moral problem, why not focus on this problem and try to elicit ethi-
cal discourse about its meaning: why should one fi rst help himself, 
then the baby? 
THE STANDARD SCORING SYSTEM 
Not only the dilemma method but also the scoring system is under 
renewed examination in the light of evidence gathered in non-West-
ern communities. At present the dilemma interview method may ac-
tually be more culturally elastic than the scoring system. However—
and here is where the help of anthropologists is necessary—the same 
methods that have been used to refi ne the current scoring manual 
could also be used to truly open it to the panorama of ethical systems 
found worldwide. 
Th e intention of the scoring system is to describe (give criteria 
for recognizing) the various forms that moral/ethical arguments may 
take and still embody the same basic logical structure. Th e scoring 
system has undergone a great deal of modifi cation in recent years as 
Kohlberg and colleagues attempt to establish a valid, reliable, stan-
dardized, readily learnable methodology. Th ey have settled upon a 
method called Standard Scoring (Colby et al. in press) that seems to 
meet most of the objections of the American psychological commu-
nity to earlier versions of the scoring system (see Colby et al. 1983). 
How well does the Standard Scoring System work for data col-
lected in non-Western communities? John Snarey, who has studied 
ethical discourse in Israel (1985), has begun to treat in a system-
atic way the cross-cultural interview materials that past researchers 
have described as diffi  cult to score. Th e focus is not on statements that 
are unscorable because they are incomplete or inadequately probed. 
Rather, the focus is on statements that are complete but do not fi t the 
stage defi nitions and criteria in the Kohlberg scoring manual. 
Snarey concludes that the Kohlberg scoring system is sometimes 
inadequate for adult specimens of ethical discourse. Some specimens 
are complete but seem ambiguous as to whether they should prop-
erly be assigned a score of stage 4 or 5, or stage 3 or 4. (Th e ambi-
guity does not seem to extend down to stages 1 and 2, which seem 
easy to recognize in every cultural sample tested so far.) Th ese prob-
lems have arisen most frequently when statements include argu-
ments for “what is right” or “reasons for doing right” that resem-
ble the criterion-judgments for a certain stage, but seem to derive 
from a “social perspective” expected at the next higher adjacent 
stage. For example, Snarey, Reimer, and Kohlberg (1985) found that 
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some Israeli kibbutz subjects used collectivist/communa1 arguments 
that were initially “guess-scored” at Stage 4 but eventually under-
stood as full postconventional Stage 5. 
Th us, at present the scoring system may misinterpret or underes-
timate the abstract complexity of some sophisticated arguments in 
non-Western cultural groups. Are these problems correctable? Yes, 
I would argue that they are, in principle. Since the entire system of 
stage defi nitions and scoring criteria has been inductively derived, 
there is no reason why in principle the system could not be further 
revised and expanded in the light of new data. Certainly this en-
deavor would receive an immeasurable boost from the participation 
of anthropologists. To expand the defi nitions and prototypes in the 
scoring manual, what is required is an extensive body of well-elabo-
rated ethical discourse with which to work, accompanied by linguis-
tic and ethnographic background knowledge to provide the context 
for correct interpretation of the speakers’ meanings. 
Many anthropologists who have examined Kohlberg’s theory have 
been disturbed by the defi nition of stages 5 and 6 in terms of a uni-
versalistic morality of justice. Kohlberg has explicitly stated that his 
theory is a “rational reconstruction of the ontogenesis of justice rea-
soning” (Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer 1983: 10). As justifi cation he 
has reinvoked the Socratic claim that “virtue is not many but one and 
its name is justice” (1983: 18). 
In contrast to Kohlberg, other cognitivists have argued that there 
is no necessity to limit the theory to justice reasoning. Kohlberg him-
self, in coming to terms with the criticisms of Carol Gilligan (1982), 
has recognized that the “dilemmas and scoring system were limited 
in the sense that they did not deal with dilemmas (or orientations to 
those dilemmas) of special relationships and obligations. Special rela-
tionships include relations to family, friends, and to groups of which 
the self is a member” (Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer 1983:20). 
It seems a reasonable hypothesis that the understanding of par-
ticularistic, status obligations by people in non-Western societies 
may be far more sophisticated than is typical in our society (Shwed-
er and Bourne 1984). Th erefore, special attention of future research-
ers should be focused upon the development of moralities of sta-
tus obligations, especially those related to kinship roles. Th is will 
require new dilemmas that involve problems of confl icting role 
obligations, or problems in which disputants seem to have confl icting 
expectations about a role (as in Lee’s “fi liality” problems). A compar-
ative science of ethical development must come to terms with ways 
in which people understand what is right about their culturally de-
fi ned status obligations. 
THE THEORETICAL DEFINITION OF THE 
HIGHER STAGES 
A third reason to take a new look at the cognitive-developmental 
perspective has to do with debate surrounding the theory, in particu-
lar the theoretical status of the upper stages. Th e upper stages have 
always been the controversial ones in Kohlberg’s system because they 
are not equally distributed across cultural groups tested, nor even 
across socioeconomic classes within the Western industrialized so-
cieties (Edwards 1975). 
You may be interested to know, therefore, that Kohlberg’s close 
colleague and “sympathetic critic,” John Gibbs, has recently argued 
that the upper stages are not actually true, “hard” develop-mental 
stages in the Piagetian sense. Rather, Gibbs (1977, 1979) asserts that 
the two upper stages (5 and 6) are “metaethical” refl ections on moral-
ity—”soft stages”—tied more to education and cultural background 
than to cognitive maturation and role-taking experience. Gibbs sug-
gests that the four “developmental stages” should be divided into two 
major levels: “immature morality” (stages 1 and 2) versus “mature 
morality” (stages 3 and 4) (also see the related arguments by German 
psychologist Lutz Eckensberger 1981). 
Kohlberg himself (Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer 1983) now rec-
ognizes that development beyond a certain point (stage 5, he would 
argue) is best considered a matter of “soft stages.” 
Th is kind of theoretical revision should have the eff ect of moving 
the fi rst four stages into center stage. Th ese stages have actually been 
rather solidly established as a developmental sequence in a wide va-
riety of cultural settings. 
Indeed, should the anthropologically minded reader turn his or 
her attention to the research conducted in non-Western communi-
ties, that reader will discover that the fi rst three to four stages of 
Kohlberg’s system apparently capture something about the quality 
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and development of ethical discourse that is not culturally specifi c. 
(Is this the rationality element? Very likely.) 
What is the basis of this conclusion? One argument derives from 
two sets of research fi ndings that have compared the ethical dis-
course of indigenously defi ned “community leaders” versus “nonlead-
ers.” Harkness, Edwards, and Super (1981) studied 12 men in the ru-
ral Kipsigis village of Kokwet in Western Kenya. Half of the men had 
local reputations as the “most honest men,” and were often called in 
to help resolve disputes, while the other half were comparably Chris-
tian, wealthy, and educated but not known for their “honesty.” Tietjen 
and Walker (in press) studied 22 men living in the Maisin coastal 
villages of Uiaku and Ganjiga, in Oro Province, Papua New Guinea. 
Th e men were divided into four groups: traditional leaders, govern-
ment leaders, religious leaders, and nonleaders. 
Both studies report that the community-defi ned “moral leaders” 
showed more “mature” (stage 3) moral reasoning than did the com-
parison group of nonleaders (who showed signifi cantly more stage 
2). Th e leaders’ ethical discourse, as elicited by the dilemma interview, 
was more systematic, and involved a societal rather than merely dyadic 
role-taking perspective on issues of right and wrong. 
Th is point can perhaps best be made through illustration. Below 
are presented the answers of the Kipsigis men (interviewed by an-
thropologist Sara Harkness) to a question in one of the dilemmas 
concerning whether or not it was bad for a father to break a promise 
to his son. Th e answers of all 12 sample men are presented, to give 
readers unfamiliar with moral-dilemma interviewing a sense of the 
rich yield that the method provides. 
Th e leaders’ answers are not only longer and more carefully ar-
gued than the nonleaders’. Th eir answers also include more focus on 
the father’s possible motivations for breaking his word, the potential 
psychological eff ects on the son, and/or the evolving nature of the 
father/son relationship. Further, the leaders attempt to address the 
question not as a specifi c instance only but rather as an example of a 
general case. 
Answers of Six “Non-Leaders” in Kokwet
1. It is bad because the father is the one who promised the son, “You work and 
when you get money, you can buy your own record player.” But now the child 
has worked and he has got the money and the father comes and breaks the 
promise. Yet he is the one who promised the son [Age 29, 7 years school]. 
2. It was bad because the father had earlier on promised his son that he can buy 
his record player. Th e father should leave the money for the child and look for 
his own money for repairing his radio [Age 50, 4 years school]. 
3. It is not so bad because what could he have done? For when all things are ar-
ranged as you want them to be, they can be altered to another way. You may 
say, “I am going to do something or such and such,” but a time may come when 
you’ll change your mind and say, “It is better for me to do that one fi rst, rather 
than the one I had intended to do.” But that’s not really changing your mind 
[Age 31, 8 years school]. 
4. He was supposed to give back the money to James because he had asked James 
to help him with money for repairing his radio. He was not to spend it without 
giving it back to James, since he had promised James that he can buy his own 
record player. It is bad to break what you said, and so nobody wants to break a 
promise [Age 47, no school]. 
5. In that case maybe the father had an idea that he was going to look for this 
money to repay his son [Age 55, no school]. 
6. It is bad for the father since he has made the promise. Breaking a promise is 
very bad and it applies to everyone. It is also bad if the father is not in good re-
lationship with his son [Age 55, no school]. 
Answers of the Six “Moral Leaders” in Kokwet
1. Once we have made a promise and none of us breaks it, then there is going to be 
respect and happiness between us. No one will be angry. Th erefore, by showing 
respect to one another the friendship is assured, and as a result this will uplift 
our prosperity in the family. My son can take my advice. It is very bad to prom-
ise your child something and then you break the promise. If no truth prevails 
between you and your son, then you will not feel happy, since you will not be 
in unity. But if it is something you agree with one another, then it is not bad. If 
the child doesn’t listen to you, then you fi nd that maybe there is not a good re-
lationship between the father and son [Age 55, no school]. 
2. It is better to say the truth because it is something like—we say it in our prov-
erb, “It is better to say the truth or to say something kind to somebody else.” It 
is something like obedience. If you don’t keep the promise you will be wrong. 
You will lose your friend by saying lies—a liar. It is wrong to break a promise 
because, say, I promise a friend of mine that I will meet him somewhere and 
then I fail to go there. Let us say he waits today and tomorrow. Th e third day 
there is no friendship at all—no connection. So that James will be disobedient 
to his father if the father breaks a promise [Age 40, 8 years school]. 
3. Considering it in the fi rst instance, the father took the money peacefully and 
not by force. Th ings taken from him by force is bad, but if it was agreed between 
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them it is good, that is, the father tells the son, “My child, now the money you 
intended to buy a record player with, let us use it for the other purpose, and next 
time you buy it.” For the son and the father to agree upon one thing is good, be-
cause [otherwise] they will struggle without peace until they buy the intended 
player [Age 55, no school]. 
4. Th e father is asking for the money, telling James, “Because you haven’t bought 
your record player yet, give me a hand in repairing my radio.” But if James had 
already bought his record player, then there would be nothing that the father 
could say. Nothing could be done [Age 50, no school]. 
5. It is not bad because you are trying to mix your blood with that of your child. 
Th e fi rst word to come out of his mouth is that he wants to go dancing to please 
himself. Th en you tell him, “Work now until you get money.” Now, how will you 
know that he is going to give you this money? What will you do, for example, 
when you have no food to eat or clothes to wear? How will you know [that he 
is being honest with you]? I, for one, as soon as my son gets money, I tell him, 
“Leave that, instead buy for me this ox for ploughing.” You will not think that 
the child has been denied his money, but that he is checked to save his heart 
to see whether his heart is straight. But if his heart is astray, then he will say, “I 
want to buy a player.” Th ereby you are not in good coordination with him. So 
it is not bad [to ask him for his money]; but for the next time, he should be al-
lowed to do his own work himself [keep his money for his own purpose] since 
he is a good child [Age 75, no school]. 
6. Th e father has the right to direct his children on what to do because he is the 
one who cares for them. [Yet] as I said earlier, the child might know that his 
father has got some money but seeks that of this child. Th e child might think, 
“Why should he take my money and yet he has got his?” Th at occurs when there 
is no unity, or there is misunderstanding between them at home. . . . Th e son 
might say, “I wish to buy a bicycle”. . . . But when parents tell the son, “Th ere 
is no money to buy for you a bicycle,” the child might struggle to progress and 
is determined to buy a bicycle. If you now come and ask him to give you the 
money while he is still progressing, then it will not be easy for him to give you, 
especially when the son knows that the father clearly understands that the son 
has never been squandering his money. And so he will not be happy to give the 
money to his father. He will say, “How can I surrender to him some of my mon-
ey and yet I want to buy a bicycle? Father has got some money and as such I am 
unable to give him mine.” And therefore in such cases, the father doesn’t have a 
right to make such unfair demands [Age 32, 6 years school]. 
In sum, in a basic way that has to do with formal characteristics 
of their ethical discourse, the moral leaders in study communities 
in Kenya and New Guinea-communities widely separated in time, 
space, and cultural tradition-sounded like each other, and the non-
leaders similarly sounded like each other. Th eir individual samples of 
ethical discourse were commensurate, to adapt Alan Page Fiske’s 
(1984) phraseology. 
CONSTRUCTIVE PROCESSES INVOLVED IN EARLY 
MORAL CONCEPTS 
A fourth and fi nal reason for anthropologists to take a second look 
at recent cognitive-developmental research has to do with the de-
bate raging within the discipline concerning the emergence of moral 
concepts in very young children. One group of cognitive-psycholo-
gists has actually defi ned for themselves a position much further out 
on the “rational self-construction” continuum than has the Kohlberg 
group. 
Eliot Turiel (1983) of Berkeley and his colleagues, Larry Nucci 
(1982) and Judith Smetana (1983), claim that not only the structure 
but also the content of basic morality is rationally self-constructed. 
Th is content, they claim, centers on issues of justice and harm and 
arises out of young children’s predisposition to engage in social role-
taking. Children empathize with people in distress (Hoff man 1975) 
and consider such questions as, “What if this were to happen to me?” 
Th ese experiences persuade them of the immorality of actions that 
harm others or violate their rights. 
Th is self-construction process, they claim, can be indirectly ob-
served by studying children’s naturally occurring “transgression” situ-
ations. Th eir studies, conducted in U.S. settings (mostly classrooms) 
suggest that when justice/harm rules are violated, two consequences 
usually take place. First, victims provide “distress” or “outrage” feed-
back, and second, if and when adults intervene, they do so in a way 
that provides children with additional concrete information about 
“what is intrinsically wrong” with harming another or violating his 
rights. Th e consequences of moral transgressions, the researchers 
conclude, diff er in critical respects from the consequences of trans-
gressions that involve nonmoral rules such as table manners and oth-
er matters of etiquette (also see Much and Shweder 1978). 
Th ese brave people may have gotten themselves out on the end 
of a long limb that is about to break (see Edwards 1985a, in press; 
Shweder 1982). Struck by the power of even young children as ac-
tive, “rational” constructers of rule-related knowledge, they have 
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underestimated the role of adults in “scaff olding” the knowledge-
construction process and “orienting” children to the culturally de-
fi ned meanings embedded in interpersonal interaction. 
In recent papers I have critiqued certain aspects of the Turiel-Nu-
cci-Smetana position, based on an empirical analysis of the social in-
teractions of Kenyan Luo children aged 2 to 12 years. Th e data come 
from the corpus of naturalistic observations collected by anthropolo-
gist Carol Ember (see Ember 1973; Bookman and Ember in press). 
Ember trained her observers (educated students from the local 
area) to record the children’s speech to one another as exactly as pos-
sible. A reexamination of her observational protocols reveals much 
about the conversational routines of the children. In particular, the 
observations are rich in interpersonal “ethical discourse-in-action” 
that takes place when parents correct or sanction children or when 
children command one another, correct one another’s misdemeanors, 
and negotiate about family responsibilities. 
Th e reanalysis of Ember’s observations suggests that Oyugis 
adults (and children) diff er from their U.S. counterparts in two 
ways. First, they seem to include in the moral domain certain kinds 
of rules that Americans consider simply conventional, or nonmoral. 
In particular, they treat as moral matters the rules of etiquette and 
proper social presentation, and also the status obligations related 
to age and sex roles. Th is cultural diff erence suggests that children 
everywhere construct notions about what is “morally desirable or 
obligatory” (versus desirable for some other reason) not simply by 
exercising their own rational powers. Rather, they must look to cul-
tural cues, to distinctions implicitly conveyed to children by means 
of powerful suggestions and corrections (D’Andrade 1981; Shwed-
er 1982). 
Second, the Oyugis observations present a contrast to the Ameri-
can materials in the typical patterns of adult and child response to 
transgression. Th is suggests that cultural communities may diff er 
sharply in the way that they communicate information to children 
about the “reasons for doing right.” For example, adults may orga-
nize their responses to children’s transgressions in ways that focus 
attention upon one or more of the following aspects: the rationale 
underlying the rule; the sanctions attached to rule violation; the af-
fect motivating obedience (empathy, guilt, shame, and so on). Ration-
ales are highlighted by use of “inductive” disciplinary techniques that 
involve discussion of why an action is wrong. Sanctions are high-
lighted by use of “power-assertive” techniques, such as physical pun-
ishment and frightening threats. Aff ects are highlighted by use of 
guilt or shame-producing techniques, such as love withdrawal, ridi-
cule, shaming, and so on (see Edwards in press; B. Whiting 1950; J. 
Whiting 1967). 
In sum, the Oyugis, Kenyan fi ndings point to the key role of cultur-
al authority in defi ning “what is right” and “reasons for doing right.” 
Nevertheless, the fi ndings by no means suggest that rational consid-
erations play a negligible role in moral and ethical decision making. 
Quite the contrary, the fi ndings reveal that the Kenyan children re-
semble the American ones in one major way. In both cultural set-
tings, the children, far from being robotic followers of cultural rules, 
seem like “little lawyers” as they negotiate their responsibilities and 
persuade one another of the proper or required course of action. Even 
children as young as 2 or 3 years of age have begun to engage in eth-
ical discourse. Th e process of ethical discourse-in-action in the two 
cultural settings seems basically more similar than diff erent. Here is 
an especially vivid observation from Oyugis of children negotiating 
moral rights and wrongs. It involves four children aged 5 to 10. One 
of them is a visitor to the homestead, while the other three are sib-
lings. 
I. (Visitor Girl, age 10) calls O. (Boy, age 8) to come get the baby because he is 
crying. O. tries to come but on the way is deliberately blocked by his little brother, 
G. (age 5). Th e visitor girl canes G. to let O. go by. 
G. complains wittily to the visitor girl, “Can’t you remember what I’ve done for 
you? I brought the baby from the other house for you, and now you’re caning me!” 
N. (Sister of G., age 8) off ers comfort to G., “If she can’t remember what you did 
for her, then never help her anymore.” 
I. (Visitor) leaves and withdraws into the house [Observation by Carol Ember, 
quoted in Edwards 1985a]. 
CONCLUSION 
What is the signifi cance of the fi ndings discussed in this paper 
for the problem of ethical relativism? First, most of the fi ndings re-
late to the problem of “descriptive relativism,” that is, whether moral 
values and ethical discourse can be “joined” across cultural bound-
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aries—abstracted from their cultural context and validly compared. 
While the evidence is far from defi nitive, nevertheless the weight of 
recent fi ndings on the psychology of ethical reasoning would seem 
to incline against any extreme doctrine of descriptive relativism. Far 
from indicating a radical “incommensurability” of ethical beliefs and 
ideas, the fi ndings suggest that human beings from diff erent cultural 
traditions can quite easily understand one another’s ethical discourse. 
It appears that in all cultural communities, the discourse draws from 
a common human pool of modes of judging, choosing, justifying, and 
validating moral action. 
Second, the fi ndings also have a bearing on the related problem of 
“normative relativism,” that is, whether ethical confl icts across cul-
tural boundaries can be resolved. Can people from diff erent tradi-
tions not only understand one another but also reach agreement on 
ethical confl icts? If, as some have asserted, most or all of morality is 
“socially transmitted,” then we would have reason to doubt that any 
ethical confl icts between cultures could ever be resolved. In contrast, 
if some part of the core of morality is rationally constructed, then we 
have good reason to suppose that “ethically competent judges” from 
diverse cultural traditions might be able to fi nd a common meeting 
ground and agree, if not on one system of moral principles, then on a 
limited universe of acceptable types of moral systems. Again, I con-
clude that the psychological research evidence inclines against an ex-
treme doctrine of normative relativism. Th ough cultural groups do 
diff er in how they order values in their hierarchy and how they de-
fi ne the parameters in their equations of “justice” (and these diff er-
ences are not rationally resolvable), yet their diff erences concern only 
some, not all, questions (Wong 1984).Much can be agreed upon. 
Th e always thoughtful and often passionate struggle to resolve ethi-
cal problems-a process that is culturally shared, not specifi c-indicates 
that we must not underestimate or ignore the rationally constructed 
aspect of morality and ethics. 
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